



Rialtas na hÉireann
Government of Ireland

Electronic Communications Security Measures

004 – Training, Awareness &
Personnel Security v1.0

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Prepared by Department of the
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1 Foreword

The Electronic Communications Security Measures (ECSMs) have been produced by the Electronic Communications Security Measures working group convened by the Irish National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), which forms part of the Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications (DECC); and with the support of the Commission for Communications Regulation (ComReg). Industry participation in the WG has involved network operators, including the Mobile Network Operators (MNO) which have been awarded 5G licences, and selected fixed line operators.

This ECSM is part of a series of documents listed below:

| Title | Subject |
|-----------------|--|
| ECSM 001 | General |
| ECSM 002 | Risk Management |
| ECSM 003 | Physical and Environmental Security |
| ECSM 004 | Training, Awareness and Personnel Security |
| ECSM 005 | Network Management & Access Control |
| ECSM 006 | Signalling Plane Security |
| ECSM 007 | Virtualisation Security |
| ECSM 008 | Network, Monitoring and Incident Response |
| ECSM 009 | Supply Chain Security |
| ECSM 010 | Diversity, Resilience & Continuity |
| ... | ... |

11 2 Introduction

12 Ireland's modern digitally connected society and economy is highly dependent on reliable
13 and secure electronic communications networks and services (ECN and ECS respectively).
14 They form the backbone of much of Ireland's critical national infrastructure providing
15 connectivity to the essential services upon which citizens rely, such as healthcare providers,
16 energy providers, financial institutions, emergency services and public administration. It is of
17 paramount importance that these vital networks and services are protected from the full
18 range of threats with an appropriate level of technical and organisation security measures.

19 This document focuses on aspects relating to training, awareness and personnel security of
20 staff employed by the operator and its managed service providers / contractors.

21 The need for highly trained and skilled staff when designing, deploying, and operating next
22 generation networks, such as 5G, was highlighted throughout the series of meetings of the
23 ECSM Working Group held throughout 2020. Likewise, the need for all staff to be aware of
24 security issues was emphasized as an important means of protecting operators and from
25 compromises to one of the three main pillars of security - the **confidentiality, integrity** and
26 **availability** of networks through robust security procedures and processes. In order to
27 ensure proper compliance with the appropriate security measures, operators need to
28 integrate security concepts into their decision making and culture through responsible
29 policies, procedures and processes - including staff training and awareness.

30 3 Scope

31 The ECSMs are applicable to all undertakings providing public Electronic Communications
32 Networks and Electronic Communications Services.

33 The legislative basis for the ECSMs is set out in ECSM 001- General

34 Security measures relating to training, awareness and personnel matters are particularly
35 important to staff who have physical or logical access to sensitive data and operational
36 networks. External attackers undermining electronic communications systems often target
37 enterprise staff initially, escalating privilege to operational parts of networks and staff working
38 in those areas. As such it is important that all new staff are screened, undergo mandatory
39 and appropriate security awareness training and that all existing staff undergo annual
40 training.

41 The legislative basis for the ECSMs is set out in ECSM 001- General

4 References

| Document | Title |
|---------------------------------|---|
| ISO/IEC 27001:2013 | Information technology — Security techniques — Information security management systems — Requirements |
| ISO/IEC 27002:2013 | Information technology — Security techniques — Code of practice for information security controls |
| NIST | Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity v1.1 |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev4 | Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations |
| NIST SP 800-50 | Building an Information Technology Security Awareness and Training Program |
| NIST SP 800-100 | Information Security Handbook: A Guide for Managers |
| ENISA | Technical Guideline on Security Measures under the EEECC |
| ENISA | Supplement to the technical guideline on Security Measures under the EEECC |
| ENISA | The new users' guide: How to raise information security awareness |
| ETSI TR 103 305-1 V3.1.1 | Critical Security Controls for Effective Cyber Defence |
| SANS | Security Awareness Report 2019 - The Rising Era of Awareness Training |

5 Definitions, Symbols and Abbreviations

5.1 Definitions

| Term | Meaning |
|--|---|
| EU 5G Security Toolbox | Cybersecurity of 5G networks - EU Toolbox of risk mitigating measures' document published jointly by member states on 31st of January 2020 |
| EU Risk Assessment | EU coordinated risk assessment of the cybersecurity of 5G networks report published jointly by the EU Member States on 09th October 2019 |
| Managed Service Provider (MSP) | A third-party that helps to run or administrate a network. |
| National Risk Assessment | Risk assessment carried out by the National Cyber Security Centre and forwarded to the European Commission on 15 July 2019. |
| Operator | An undertaking providing or authorised to provide a public electronic communications network or an associated facility; |
| Personnel | The people who work for an organisation. |
| Security Awareness Program | A set of policies the organisation implements to create a culture of security for its staff. |
| Security of Networks and Services | The ability of electronic communications networks and services to resist, at a given level of confidence, any action that compromises the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of those networks and services, of stored or transmitted or processed data, or of the related services offered by, or accessible via, those electronic communications networks or services |

46 **5.2 Symbols**

47 Nil

48 **5.3 Abbreviations**

| Term | Meaning |
|---------------|---|
| AV | Anti Virus |
| ComReg | The Commission for Communications Regulation |
| CSIRT | Computer Security Incident Response Team |
| DECC | The Department of Environment, Climate and Communications |
| ECSM | Electronic Communications Security Measure |
| JML | Joiner, Mover, Leaver |
| MNO | Mobile Network Operator |
| MSP | Managed Service Providers |
| NCSC | National Cyber Security Centre |

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50

51 **6 Overview of Risk**

52 Creating an effective security awareness program is key to securing any organisation, large
53 or small. Demystifying security and educating users about their role in protecting the
54 organisation helps cultivate a robust first line of defence. Likewise, ensuring that appropriate
55 personnel security policies are in place helps protect the organisation from breaches of
56 confidentiality, integrity and availability arising from poor staff practices and poor human
57 resources policy, or training, or the lack of implementation of such policies and training.

58 Cybersecurity can often be considered primarily a technical challenge; however, the actions
59 of staff can have a huge impact in maintaining the security, confidentiality, integrity and
60 availability of networks. A range of personnel play a crucial role throughout the design,
61 deployment and operation of electronic communications networks. They fulfil important
62 functions including in system development and programming, network operations
63 engineering, security functions and in executive decision-making. All personnel face security
64 challenges – including avoiding the introduction of vulnerabilities or compromises at any
65 points in the network. Staff and other personnel within an organisation can be faced with any
66 number of threats from different sources, such as:


- 67 • Phishing campaigns and other social engineering attempts,
- 68 • Ransomware and other malicious attacks,
- 69 • Cyber espionage and
- 70 • Network misconfigurations and human errors.

71 An organisation may be vulnerable where there are gaps or seams between policy and
72 technology (e.g. policies that have no technical enforcement) or during times of vulnerability,
73 for example during a window of patching or system changes. A staff member with a poor
74 understanding of cybersecurity threats and risks make an organisation vulnerable, as
75 attackers target weaknesses in humans in order to overcome technical security controls.
76 Therefore, an effective security training and awareness regime is critical to protecting the
77 confidentiality, integrity and availability of an operator's network.

78 In addition to external actors, an operator's own personnel can also act as a vector or target
79 for security incidents, such as where there is staff incompetency or because of the actions
80 from a malicious insider. The actions of insiders, be they staff or a subcontractor, working
81 within electronic communications operators was highlighted as a serious concern in the EU-
82 wide Risk Assessment, being rated second only to Nation States as representing the most
83 serious threat actors:

84 ***“It is also noted that insiders or subcontractors can in certain circumstances also be***
 85 ***considered potential threat actors, especially if leveraged by States as they could be***
 86 ***used as a channel for a State to gain access to critical target assets”***

87 Accordingly, in areas where operators delegate operational control -even if very temporarily-
 88 they should ensure that their partners sign-up to the organisation’s key security principles
 89 and can abide by them and that there are implications where issues arise.



90
 91 **Figure 1 – Threat Actors**

92 The increasingly complex nature of electronic communications networks and the need for
 93 highly specialised and trained personnel was also emphasised as an issue given that this
 94 expertise is difficult to source.

95 ***“Lack of specialised and trained personnel to secure, monitor and maintain 5G***
 96 ***networks: the fast-evolving threat landscape and technology and the complexity of 5G***
 97 ***networks will lead to an increased need for IT security professionals with specialized***
 98 ***knowledge (e.g. competence in the areas of cloud architecture).”***

99 In order to effectively address cybersecurity risks it is paramount that operators take actions
 100 to reduce the risks arising from the vulnerabilities that are tolerated or are caused wilfully or
 101 by human error. Empowering staff with good security training, awareness, personnel policies
 102 and procedures can significantly increase an operator’s readiness in effectively responding
 103 to a security threat.

104 **7 Security Measures**

105 The operator should implement the Training, Awareness and Personnel Security Measures
 106 in a manner that is customised to be appropriate and proportionate to the organisation.

107

| Measure | Description |
|-------------------------------|--|
| Personnel Security | |
| TP.01 | Operators shall have appropriate personnel security policies, procedures and processes in place which are approved by senior management, communicated to staff and reviewed regularly. |
| TP.02 | Roles within the organisation with access to network management systems or sensitive data shall be assessed and assigned a risk designation. |
| TP.03 | Operators shall establish a screening process for new staff in roles considered high risk, such as those which require administrative access to operational networks or handling sensitive data. |
| TP.04 | Employee contracts, or codes of conduct, shall include employee and operator obligations regarding security, particularly for roles assessed as high risk. |
| TP.05 | Operators shall have an appropriate disciplinary process in place to take action against personnel who commit a serious breach of their security obligations. |
| TP.06 | Operators shall have an appropriate joiner, mover, leaver (JML) process. The JML process shall link human resource processes with other relevant organisation processes, such as security authorisations and access control. This process should be automated wherever feasible. |
| Training and Awareness | |
| TP.07 | Operators shall have appropriate training and awareness policies, procedures and processes in place which are approved by senior management, communicated to staff, and reviewed regularly. |
| TP.08 | New employees shall receive security & awareness training as part of their on |

| | |
|--------------|---|
| | boarding process. This training should be repeated periodically, at least annually. |
| TP.09 | Personnel, particularly those in high-risk roles, shall be sufficiently competent and shall have a level of skill, education, and training appropriate to their position. |
| TP.10 | Role based training shall be provided to personnel in roles assessed as high risk. It should cover as a minimum, how to: detect and avoid common cybersecurity attacks, to recognise anomalous behaviours, handle sensitive data and to report and respond to security incidents. |
| TP.11 | The operator shall maintain records of all security training. |

108

109

110 **8 Implementation Guidance**

111 The implementation guidance in the following subsections is applicable to the security
 112 measures in section 7 as shown in Table 1 below.

113 **Table 1 – Security Measures to Guidance Mapping**

| | TP. 01 | TP. 02 | TP. 03 | TP. 04 | TP. 05 | TP. 06 | TP. 07 | TP. 08 | TP. 09 | TP. 10 | TP. 11 |
|-----|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| 8.1 | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | |
| 8.2 | | | | | ✓ | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| 8.3 | | ✓ | ✓ | | | | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |
| 8.4 | ✓ | | | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | | ✓ | | | |

114

115 **8.1 Security Training and Awareness Programme**

116 **Applicable Security Measures:** TP.01, TP.02, TP.04, TP.07, TP.08, TP.09

117 The most effective approach to implementing the *Security Measures* described above is for
 118 operators to implement a comprehensive Security Training and Awareness programme
 119 which is governed by overarching security policies. Accordingly, the programme should
 120 cover security principles, vulnerabilities and threats, most common sources of attacks, how
 121 to defend against them and knowing the response required.

122 The operators Risk Management process, as outlined in ECSM 002 – Risk Management, is
 123 a key factor in establishing appropriate security training and awareness policies and
 124 procedures. The procedures should be established both for a general security programme
 125 and one that is for particular information systems. The security training and awareness
 126 programme should, as a minimum, identify the scope of who needs to be trained in the
 127 program. In particular, care should be taken to ensure that those personnel in roles
 128 considered high risk, such as those which require administrative access to operational
 129 networks or handling sensitive data receive an appropriate level of security and awareness
 130 training. In order for a security training and awareness programme to be successful, it should
 131 be led by a Security Training and Awareness officer and championed at the most senior
 132 level of management of the organisation.

133 The aim of the security training and awareness programme should, in the first instance, be to
134 communicate the operator's security policies and requirements to ensure that the operator's
135 personnel know, understand and can follow the set down policies, procedures and
136 processes. The security training and awareness programme should be **risk-based**, in line
137 with ECSM 002, and the operator's security team should help identify the main human risks
138 to the organisation.

139 The focus of the security training and awareness programme is identifying which personnel
140 behaviours require modification in order to effectively manage the main risks. The ultimate
141 goal of a successful security training and awareness programme is to have a workforce
142 which acts in a secure manner, resulting in a reduced risk profile for the operator.

143 Certain personnel, such as those in roles considered high risk, or with access to certain
144 critical systems, may require additional specialised training in addition to a general security
145 training and awareness programme.

146 It is important that security awareness training is recorded, and key metrics are measured
147 over time in order to track the effectiveness of the security training and awareness
148 programme. A security training and awareness programme should be focussed on the long-
149 term goal of creating a security culture within the operator by embedding security behaviours
150 in personnel throughout the organisation.

151 **8.2 Security & Awareness Training**

152 **Applicable Security Measures:** TP.05, TP.07, TP.08, TP.09, TP.10, TP.11

153 The content of security awareness training can vary depending on the level of risk
154 presented, and on the user base at which it is aimed. The key aim of the program is to
155 modify the behaviour of staff and create a security culture within the organisation; therefore
156 the security awareness training should take a long-term view, and not a "*fire and forget*"
157 approach. While a "one size fits all approach" is not possible, a typical security and
158 awareness training should cover at least three types of roles:

- 159 • All personnel (or general),
- 160 • Specialized staff and
- 161 • Management.

162 As a minimum basic security awareness training should include an understanding of the
163 need for information security and user actions to maintain security and to respond to

164 suspected security incidents.¹ It should also include an overview of the operator's security
165 policies, procedures, and processes, as well as staff's shared obligations to security. The
166 training should cover basic cyber hygiene and how to detect and avoid common
167 cybersecurity attacks. Users should be taught how to recognise anomalous behaviours,
168 handle sensitive data and to report and respond to security incidents. In addition, the training
169 should provide users with an overview of the cyber threat environment.

170 There are various techniques that can be used to provide security awareness training
171 including, displaying posters, offering supplies inscribed with security reminders, generating
172 email advisories/notices from senior organisational officials, displaying logon screen
173 messages, and conducting information security awareness events. However, a more
174 engaging and proactive approach generally has more effective results such as running
175 simulated phishing attack exercises, executive level tabletop exercises or simulated cyber
176 attack exercises.

177 As outlined in the *Overview of Risk* section, insider threats continue to be a serious threat to
178 operators' security. As such, in addition to personnel security policies, operators should
179 provide training to staff on common signs to look for in detecting a malicious insider or
180 disgruntled employee and how this should be reported to management. The UK CPNI has
181 detailed guidance on reducing insider threats.²

182 In addition to the general security awareness training, certain persons in roles considered to
183 be high risk, should be provided with specific role-based training. System or network
184 administrators, or users with privileged access or who possess valuable information, should
185 receive training which is specific to the systems which they oversee. As high value targets,
186 senior executives should receive enhanced security training, particularly in how to detect
187 targeted spear phishing and social engineering attacks, be aware of current information on
188 security threats and effective countermeasures.

189 In order to understand whether a security training and awareness programme has been
190 effective, it is important to record key metrics, for example improvements in staff security
191 behaviours.

192 Finally, management needs to be clear in its messaging to all staff in terms of the policies
193 and practices it pursues externally and internally. Security and privacy are a core corporate
194 responsibility underpinned by legal obligations and norms.

¹ *All staff should be made aware of the importance of strong passwords and password controls; secure e-mail practices; secure practices for working remotely; secure browsing practices while avoiding malicious software – viruses, spyware, adware.*

² [Reducing Insider Risk by good personnel security practices | Public Website \(cpni.gov.uk\)](https://www.cpni.gov.uk/reducing-insider-risk-by-good-personnel-security-practices)

195 **8.3 Screening**

196 **Applicable Security Measures:** TP.02, TP.03, TP.08, TP09, TP.10

197 Operators are required to establish a screening process for roles which are considered as
198 high risk. The purpose of a screening process is to ensure that only competent and
199 adequately skilled personnel have access to the operator's most critical systems and
200 sensitive data. The level of screening should be in proportion to the risks presented. The
201 screening process should follow a clear policy which at a minimum outlines which roles
202 should be screened, who in the organisation is authorised to screen people and how,
203 guidance on screening is provided in ISO 27002 § 7.

204 Operators should include due diligence measures to ensure that the personnel they employ
205 are who they say they are, hold the qualifications they purport to, are of good character and
206 competent to perform their duties. As part of the screening process, information provided by
207 candidates should wherever possible be independently verified.

208 Information, particularly relating to academic performance and skills should be independently
209 verified, including from universities. The operator should have a process to verify the identity
210 of any prospective employees. Operators should seek character references from previous
211 employers or trusted introducers, particularly with regard to competence to perform the
212 duties and trusted to take on roles considered as being high risk. Consider retaining third
213 party expert recruiters to confirm all details. Information may be obtained from searches of
214 the public domain but must be done so in line with relevant legislation, including providing
215 the candidate with an opportunity to comment.

216 The screening process must be conducted on a lawful basis, consistent with relevant
217 privacy, equality and employment legislation, including, inter alia, the Data Protection Act
218 2018, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and the Employment Equality Acts
219 1998 – 2015. Operators must comply with the principles of data protection (Article 5 GDPR)
220 in their collection and use of personal data.

221 **8.4 Joiners, Movers, Leaver (JML) Process**

222 **Applicable Security Measures:** TP.01, TP.04, TP.05, TP.06, TP.08

223 Often a key failing of security is the result of Human Resource processes not linking with
224 other relevant organisational processes. For example, personnel may have a higher level of
225 access than required or maintain their access to critical systems or sensitive data after they
226 have moved positions or left the organisation entirely. It may also result in personnel not

227 receiving key induction or follow-up training, or not understanding their obligations while they
228 were with the organisation or after they have left. Exit interviews should be conducted in
229 order that staff are made aware that their obligations to maintain confidential information
230 regarding security and privacy of sensitive information after they have left the organisation.

231 Operators should ensure that their HR processes include providing new employees with
232 adequate induction training, including security training and awareness, which outlines the
233 security obligations and responsibilities expected of new employees. The HR process should
234 also be linked to IT and security processes which provide the appropriate level of security
235 authorisations and access to new employees. The joiners process should also ensure that
236 personnel have the appropriate equipment and technology available to conduct their work in
237 a secure manner. Similarly, credentials such as ID cards and badges should be issued as
238 part of the joiners' process.

239 When personnel change roles, or take on new responsibilities, there should be a specific
240 movers' process, which provides them with any new security authorisations and access, and
241 revokes previous credentials, security clearance and access. Employees should receive
242 adequate training for their new roles.

243 Finally, as part of the leaver's process personnel should have all security authorisations,
244 clearances and associated accesses revoked. All operator owned equipment and data
245 should be reclaimed, and credentials such as ID cards and badges returned. Employee
246 contractual arrangements should ensure that there are obligations on employees to maintain
247 confidential information regarding security and privacy of sensitive information after they
248 have left the organisation. It is best practice to conduct employee exit interviews as part of a
249 leavers process, which may be used as an opportunity to remind personnel of their
250 continuing security obligations.

251 The JML process, particularly when it comes to security authorisations and access to
252 information systems, should be directly linked with HR processes and automated wherever
253 possible. The JML process should also be subject to monitoring and audit to ensure that
254 they are fit for purpose, reflect best practice and that the policies are being adhered to.

255

256 **9 Relevant References**

257 The following standards, guidelines and reports offer further detail and will assist operators
258 in designing policies, procedures and processes that meet the *Security Measures* outlined in
259 Section 7 of this document.

260 **9.1 NIST SP 800-53: Security and Privacy Controls for** 261 **Federal Information Systems and Organizations**

262 [NVD - Rev4 \(nist.gov\)](#)

263 This publication provides a catalogue of security and privacy controls to protect
264 organizational operations, assets, individuals, from a diverse set of threats including hostile
265 cyber attacks, natural disasters, structural failures, and human errors.

266 Relevant to this ECSM are the families of controls Awareness and Training (AT) and
267 Personnel Security (PS) which cover in more detail, many of the recommended security
268 measures.

269 **9.2 NIST SP 800-50: Building an Information Technology** 270 **Security Awareness and Training Program**

271 [SP 800-50, Building an Information Technology Security Awareness and Training Program |](#)
272 [CSRC \(nist.gov\)](#)

273 NIST Special Publication 800-50, Building an Information Technology Security Awareness
274 and Training Program, provides guidance for building an effective information technology
275 (IT) security program.

276 The document identifies the four critical steps in the life cycle of an IT security awareness
277 and training program: 1) awareness and training program design; 2) awareness and training
278 material development; 3) program implementation; and 4) post-implementation.

279 **9.3 ENISA: The new users' guide: How to raise information** 280 **security awareness**

281 [The new users' guide: How to raise information security awareness \(EN\) — ENISA](#)
282 [\(europa.eu\)](#)

283 The guide presents an analysis of the main processes to prepare and implement information
284 security awareness programmes in public and private organisations. Each process is

285 analysed and time-related activities and dependencies are identified. The process modelling
286 serves as a jumpstart for awareness programme development.

287

288 **9.4 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 & ISO/IEC 27002:2013**

289 Clause A.7 – Human Resource security covers the controls an organisation needs to
290 implement prior, during and after employment. It covers areas such as screening, terms and
291 conditions of employment, management responsibilities, information security awareness,
292 education & training, disciplinary procedures, and termination of employment.

293 [https://www.nsai.ie/certification/management-systems/iso-iec-27001-information-security-
management-system/](https://www.nsai.ie/certification/management-systems/iso-iec-27001-information-security-
294 management-system/)